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DEMAND FLUCTUATIONS AND
CAPACITY UTILIZATION UNDER DUOPOLY

J. J. Gabszewicz • and S. Poddar •

September 1995

Abstract
This paper studies the in1pact of uncertain de1nand on firn1s 1 capacity decisions when
they operate in an oligopolistic environ111ent. VVe define a two-stage game where firn1s

choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of nature is going to
realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. VVe prove
the existence of a syn1metric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess

capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty
equivalent gan1e.

• CORE, Universite catholique de Louvain.
We thank Y Smeers for his helpful and interesting comments.
This text presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles
of Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office, Science Policy
Programming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by its authors.

1. Introduction

This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms' capacity decisions \Vhen they operate in an oligopolistic e11viron1nent. The effect of uncertain
demand fluctuatious on expected profits. expected price and capacity in competitive. or monopolistic industries has been extensively analysed (sec Oi (1961).
Sandmo (1971). Leland (1972), Dreze and Gabszewicz ( 1967), Smith (19G9), Dreze
and Sheshinski (1976)). To the best of our knowledge, no similar contributions
have been devoted to the same problem, with assuming that demand fluctuations
are faced by firms in a context of strategic interaction. 1 This context implies that
firms must adjust their capacity not only in view of meeting output demand levels varying acroso the states of Nature, but also for providing best output replies
against the capacity and output strategies chosen by rival firms. In this random
environment, firms play a game simultaneously against Nature and against their
rivals. We assume however a kind of sequentiality in this intertwined game: when
firms have to make their output decisions, they know which state the Nature has
chosen; but they do not know it when they make their capacity choice. This situation lends itself to be formalized as a two-period sequential game in which firms
choose capacity in the first stage (without knowing which state is going to realize),
and output levels in the second (knowing which state is realized). In the second
stage. firms play a Cournot game, conditional on the capacity levels decided in the
first stage. If, between the first and the second stage, Nature has chosen a "boom"
demand function, a firm with a low capacity level chosen in the first stage is unable to play in the second stage the Cournot output corresponding to the boom,
but can at best, play a quantity equal to its chosen capacity. On the contrary,
if Nature has chosen a "recession" demand function, a firm having chosen a high
capacity level can play the Cournot output corresponding to recession, but remains with a costly idle capacity. A subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage
game defined above must take simultaneously into account the strategic aspects
of firms' behaviour and the cost considerations related to possible underutilization
of capacity.
1

A recent literature considers infinitely repeated price competition when the industry is submitted to exogenous demand shocks (see, in particular, Rotenberg, J.
and G. Saloner (1986) and Kandori, M. (1991)). Even if these contributions are
somewhat related to the present paper, they are formulated in the totally different
approach of a supergame theoretic model. The purpose is also different since they
study the impact of demand shocks on collusive behaviour of firms.
1

Our model assumes that total demand varies linearly with output in each
state of Nature: with a randon1 intercept over the states. The industry consists of
two firms. each with tho same cost structure of the inelastic type. For this context.
first we prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. Then.
we fully characterize it, in terms of the capacity chosen ttt equilibrium and of the
set of states at which firms decide, for reducing the cost of capacity. to choose a
capacity smaller than the Cournot output level corresponding to these states.
Under pure competition, it is known that firms operate production, on average, at a level which is smaller than capacity. This is due to the fact that the
number of firms for which expected profits are equal to zero, exceeds the number of firms for which the average cost of output per firm is minimum (see, for
instance, Dreze and Sheshinski (1976) ). Here we obtain an analogous excess capacity property when we compare the capacity chosen by the firms at the symmetric
subgame perfect equilibrium, with the capacity they would choose if they would
play a Cournot game with a "certainty equivalent" demand function. We found
that uncertain capacity chosen by the firms at the symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium is at least greater than or equal to the capacity they would choose if
they would play a Cournot game with "certainty equivalent'' demand function. By
contrast, expected output and expected price are shown to coincide at equilibrium
with the output and price resulting from the same Cournot "certainty equivalent"
game.
We present the model and the two-stage game in section 2. Section 3 is
devoted to the existence and characterization of the symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium for the two-stage game defined in section 2. Section 4 compares the
duopoly solution with the monopoly case. and with the "certainty equivalent"
Cournot game. We end up with some concluding remarks collected in section 5.

2. The model
We consider two fir1ns with the sarne cost structure facing uncertain de111and.

The cost structure is of inelastic type: when production does not exceed capacity.
costs increase linearly with output; when production exceeds capacity, costs are
infinite, i.e.

C(k, q) = {Jk + "{q,
= oo,
2

q -o; k;
k < q.

We assume that there are n states of Nature and the demand in state i is given by

Pi(Q) =Ai - Q,
with Q denoting aggregate supply. Furthermore we assume that Ai > 'Y + {3,
i = 1, · · ·.n.

We study a two-stage game in which firms choose capacity k1 and k 2 in the
first stage and output levels q1 and q2 in the second stage. When choosing capacity,
firms do not know which state will realize, while they choose output knowing which
state has realized. We assume the existence of an objective probability density pi,

E7=t Pi = 1. Firms are assumed to be
risk-neutral. We are interested in a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium corresponding to firms' strategies (k;, q;);=t,2, in which firm j chooses first capacity
k; and then output level q;.

i = 1, ... , n. over the states of Nature,

Assume that firms have chosen capacities k 1 and k2 in the first stage and let
us consider the second stage game. The second stage payoff of firm j in state i is
defined by
IT;; (q;, qh, k;, kh) = (A; - q; - qh)q; - 1q; - f3k;, if q; S kj and qh S kh;

> kh;
(A; - k; - kh)k; - 1k1 - f3k;,if qj > kj and qh > kh.

= (A, - qj - kh)qj - {qj - f]kj, if q; S k; and qh
=

(1)

It is easy to verify that, when both firms' capacities kt and k2 exceed the Cournot

Y in state i~ the unique second stage "unconstrainedi' Nash equilibrium is given by (
Y, A;:J '1) in state i. When both firms' capacities k1 and

output At

i

A3

k2 are smaller than the Cournot outcome A, 3-y in state i, the unique second
stage Nash equilibrium in state i is given by (k1, k2)- In the asymmetric case,
when k; 2
Y while kh < Aii 'Y, the unique second stage Nash equilibrium
- ,,' } , kh ] where A ' - k1 ' - 'Y is the best reply outin state i is [min { kj, A ' - kh
2
2
put of firm j against kh.

A3

Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the second stage equilibrium in state i. Figure
1.1 corresponds to the case where capacities k 1 and k2 chosen in the first stage
are both insufficient to produce the Cournot outcome (
A;:J
in state
i. Figure 1.2 illustrates the second stage equilibrium when firm 1 is capacity

y,

Y)

constrained at k 1 and firm 2 has chosen a capacity k2 in the first stage sufficient
to play its best reply against k 1 •
3
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L
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I
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I
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Figure 1.2

Figure 1.1

In the next section, we characterize a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
(SSPE) and prove its existence. This symmetry allows us to define the first-stage
game payoffs only on a restricted set of first stage strategies (k 1 , kz).
3. The symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE)
To characterize a SSPE, we shall write the first stage payoff of each firm under
the assumption that both firms in the second stage are constrained (resp. unconstrained) by capacity on exactly the same subset of states of Nature. Indeed this
property must necessarily hold at a SSPE whenever it exists: in such an equilil>rinm, both firms choose the same capacity level, which implies that unconstrained
Cournot outcomes can be reached by both firms on exactly the same subset of
states. Accordingly, in order to characterize a SSPE, we have only to consider the
second stage equilibria which are given by (k 1 , k2 ) in those states where capacity
7 ) in those states i where firms are
constraints are active, and by
'I,

(A, - A, 3

not constrained by installed capacity. Since A, < A,+ 1 for all i = 1, ... , n, it is
clear that if capacities (k1,k2) are binding for some states (namely, k1 and k2 are
less than A.,31), they will be also binding for all states i, wheres< i < n.

4

Denoting by;• the largest index of states for which capacities are not binding.
expected payoff

"'i (k1. k2) for firm 1 is given by

and by II,; (k1. k2). with

for firm 2.
Consider a candidate SSPE of the two stage game, and let i' denote that
state for which. at the corresponding candidate, both firms are not constrained
up to state i', but constrained in the states s with i' + 1 :S s :S n. At this candidate subgame perfect equilibrium. first-order conditions for a maximum should
be satisfied. that is,
n

L

- 2k1 - k2 - 'Y] - ,6 = 0

(4)

p,[A,-2k2-k1-'Y]-,6=0.

(5)

p, [A .•

s=i• +1

and
n

L
s=i•+l

It is easy to verify that the second order conditions for a maximum are also satisfied. Now (4) holds¢>

(t

1

k, =

n

2

I:

Ps

p,(A, - k2 -

-y)) -

,6
n

2

s=i·+1

s=i~+l

Similary, (5) holds

n

2

p,

¢>

1

kz =

I:

S=i*+l

I:

p,

(t

p,(A, -k 1

s=i~+1

s=i·+1

--y))-

,6
n

2

I:

.<i=i·+1

5

p,

Using the symmetry property. we solve the above system for k1 = kz = k•, say,
which yields

(6)

Notice in particular that, if it is optimal for the firm to choose i' + l to be equal
to 1, so that the firm chooses to be constrained in all states, then we get

k* =

~s=_l_ _ _ _ __

(7)

3

Proposition 1. For the pai1· (k', k') to be part of a SSPE with jinns constrained
from state (i' + 1) onwards, it is necessarily true that

L

p,(A, - A.·+1 < {3 S

L Ps(A, -

A;·).

(8)

Proof. To be a part of a SSPE with both firms unconstrained up to state i", k'
must exceed the Cournot outcome under state i', i.e. k' =". A;· -y, an inequality

3
which is satisfied if, and only if. the right inequality of (8) holds. By a similar
argument, it must be necessarily true that k' < A,. +j - 'I, an inequality which
is satisfied if, and only if, the left inequality of (8) holds.

•

So far we have shown that, to be a part of a SSPE in which both firms are not
capacity constrained up to state i*, capacities must be defined by (6) and satisfy
the parametric conditions (8). Yet, this is not sufficient to guarantee that (k', k')
is a SSPE. We have still to prove that, under (8), no unilateral strategic deviation
from k' can be advantageous to any firm.
Proposition 2. Under (8), the pair (k', k') is part of a SSPE with firms constrained from state (i'

+ 1)

onwards.

Proof. See appendix for the detailed proof. Here we provide a sketch of the proof.

Consider that firm 1 deviates from k• by increasing its capacity to a level k 1 which
exceeds k•, while firm 2 stays at k'. As soon as k 1 exceeds the Cournot outcome
6

in state 'i.'" + 1, firrn 1 is no longer capacity-constrained in i* + 1; accordingly)
the payoff in the first stage game as a function of ki is no longer provided by
(2). Prom now on. firm 1 can play it., best reply against k' in all second stage
games con~sponding to states where these best replies are smaller or equal to k 1 .
Thus, given k1 • the first stage game payoff of firm 1 consists of three terms: the
first term corresponds to the expected profit obtained from playing the Cournot
outcome in all states a ::,:; i'; the second term corresponds to the expected profit
of playing the best replies against k' in all second stage games corresponding to
states where the best replies are smaller or equal to kl. The third term represents
the expected profit over all states where the capacity k1 is not large enough to
produce the best reply against k' in the corresponding states (the mathematical
expression of this payoff is provided by formula (I) in the appendix). For instance,
assume that k 1 belongs to the interval [R,·+1(k•),Ri·+2(k.)) where R·+i(k•)
(resp. Ri•+2(k•)) denotes the solution of the problem max,,{ Ai·+1 -k• -q)q-1q},
(resp. maxq{Ai·+2 -k• - q)q - 'YQ}), i.e. R;·+1 (k•) (resp. R·+2(k.)) is the best
reply against k• in the second-stage game in state;•+ 1 (resp. i' + 2). Then the
payoff II,·+1(k 1,k') for this deviation kl consists of the sum of three terms: (i)

I:~~ 1 Pu

[ (Au 3-

i)

2
-

/lk 1] (expected payoff of playing the Cournot outcome in
2

states er S i'); (ii) Pi·+ 1 { [R,.+ 1(k.)) - {Jk 1} (expected payoff of playing the best
reply against k• in the second stage game under state i' +1); (iii) I:~~i'+ 2 p.(A.k• - k 1 - 'Y - {J)k1 (expected payoff over the st.ates where the firm is constrained
to play k 1 ). It is shown in the appendix that the graph corresponding to this
payoff can be represented as in figure l, where the graph of the payoff rr,. (kl' k')
is also plotted. The interesting fact is that the graph of II,·+1(k1,k') is not only
strictly concave, but it "cuts" the graph of II,. (k 1 , k') when k 1 is equal to the best
reply R·+1 (k•) in their respective decreasing parts. From this we conclude that
the payoff rr,.+ 1(k1. k') for k 1 E [R,.+ 1(k•), R;·+2(k")[ is smaller than the payoff
II,.+ 1(R,.+ 1(k'),k'). which itself is equal to II,.(R,·+ 1 (k'),k'). Furthermore,
we know that II;·(R,.+ 1 (k'),k') is less than II,.(k',k'). Hence, no deviation
k 1 in [R,.+ 1 (k•), R,.+ 2 (k')[ can be profitable. Then proceeding recursively by
assuming kl in [Ri'+2(k'),R·+3(k•)[ ... ·.[Rn-1(k'),R,,(k')). we show that no
deviation k 1 :'.': k' can be profitable for firm l.

7

n,.,11, .• 1
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n,.()

--~-1

I
I
I
3(A,. -1) k'

'
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Figure 2.2

Figure 2.1

Now, assume that firm 1 deviates by decreasing its capacity from k*, while
firm 2 stays at k', Clearly no deviation kl with A;.
:<:: k 1 < k' can be prof-

i )'

itable, So we must only consider deviations kl with k 1 < A;. 3- )'. When k 1 is
chosen between the Cournot outcomes in the second stage games under state s
and states+ 1, 1 < s :Si' -1, the payoff of firm 1 Il,(k 1 ,k') in the first stage
game consists again in the sum of three terms (see formula (II) in the appendix): (i)

I;~;;,\ Pu

[ ( Au3-1}2 - /3k1] (expected payoff of playing the Cournot

outcome in states u :S s - 1); (ii) I;~·=, Pu [(A. - Au 3- )' - kl - "I - ,13) k1] (expected payoff in all states with firm 1 constrained by kl and firm 2 playing the
corresponding Cournot outcome: remember that firm 2 has capacity equal to k',
and can thus produce the Cournot outcome for all states u with u :S i'); and
(iii)
+1 Pu [(Au - k' - k1 - "I - ,6) ki] (expected payoff with both firms constrained, firm 1 by k 1 , firm 2 by k'), For instance, assume that k 1 is chosen in the
, t erval J A;--i - "I , A,. - "'' I ('1.e. s = i" - 1) . Tlien t h e payoff I1 i•-i (k 11 k') in
,
in
3
the first stage game obtains as

z:::=i'

1
'~(A"
- --- )
3

n,._1(k1,k)=~

2

+p,.

[( A,.-

A,.-"!
-k1-1) kl
3

l

n

+

L

Pa(Au - k' - k1 -7)k1 - ,l3k1.

O'=i· + l

It is shown in the appendix that the graph of

rr,. _1 (k 1, k') can be represented as

on figure 2 where the graph of the payoff rr,. (k 1 , k') is also plotted. The interesting fact is that not only the graph of rr,._ 1 (k 1 , k') is strictly concave, but it "cuts"
8

the graph of IT,. ( k 1 • k•) when k 1 is equal to the Cournot outcome A,. - 7 under
3
state i• in their respective increasing parts. From this we conclude that the payoff rr,. _1 (k 1 , k') is smaller than the payoff IT,. _ 1
-1,
which itself being

(A,.

equal to IT,.

k')

(A,. 3- '( k•), is smaller than IT,. (k', k•).

tion k 1 in the interval [A,. _ 1
recursively by assuming

k1

in

-

Accordingly, no devia-

1 , A;. - Y [ can be profitable. Then. proceeding

3

[A;·- 1,A;·2 -

1 -

1 [ ... ,

[A 1 -1,
3

A3-1[, we
2

show that no deviation kl <:'. k• can be profitable for firm 1. Applying a similar
argument for deviations of firm 2 leads to a complete proof of proposition 2.
4. A comparison with monopoly and with the uncertainty equivalent
case
It is interesting to compare the duopoly solution which as just been derived
with the monopoly case. Given state i, the monopolist's optimal output is A; Y.
As under duopoly, the monopolist, facing the same uncertain demand and the
same cost conditions, can freely choose its capacity and, accordingly, the subset of
states under which this capacity exceeds the monopoly output in the corresponding
states. If the monopolist's capacity km is chosen so as to be unconstrained up to
state im, expected profit writes as

i

The first order condition for a maximum requires that

dE
dkm = 0 ~

L"

p,(A, - 2km -1) = {3.

s=im+l

Solving for km ~r k:O, leads to

k" =
m

~ [·~~+1
2

n

p,A, - {3 - ']

I:

I

·

(9)

p,

s=tm+l

An argument similar to the one used in the duopoly case shows that exactly the
same condition on {3 (see equation (8)) as in the duopoly case, guarantees that
9

it is indeed optimal for the monopolist to choose km so as to be unconstrained
up to state im. However, a direct comparison betweeu (9) and (6) reveals that
k;,. < 2k', so that total installed capacity in the duopoly case exceeds the installed
capacity under monopoly.
Now, it is also of interest to compare both monopoly and duopoly capacities
with the certainty equivalent case. This case is defined as a deterministic market, in
which the demand function P(Q) would be equal to the expected demand function
resulting from the randomness of demand over the n states of Nature, i.e.
n

n

n

P(Q) = Lp,P,(Q) = LP;(A; -Q) = LP•Ai - Q,
i=l

i=l

i=l

with Q denoting aggregate supply.
In the dnopoly situation, it is easy to check that the Cournot outcome corresponding to the certainty equivalent case is given by
n

(10)
so that it coincides with the duopoly solution ki = k2 = k' under uncertainty when
firms choose to be constrained over all states (see (7)). In all other cases, when it
is optimal for the firms to be constrained over a restricted set of states only, we get
that k' > k, with k' defined by (6). Indeed. assume on the contrary that k' '.;; k,
with both firms having chosen to be constrained from state i' + 1 onwards. This
implies that

,.

(11)

Using the right hand side of (8), which holds since it is optimal for the firms to be
constrained from state i' + 1 onwards, we get
n

{3 '.;;

L

p,(A, - A,.).

s=i•+t

10

(12)

Thus, combining (11) and (12), we must have

s=l

,.

which implies

< Lp,A.,
s=l

a contradiction. Thus we have proved the following

Proposition 3. Whenever at the SSPE, firms choose to be unconstmined in at
least one state, then the capacity chosen by the firms at fflUilibrium exceeds the
capacity they would choose in the certainty fflUivalent case.
At the monopoly, the certainty equivalent optimal capadty

km obtains as
(13)

A similar argument as in proposition 3 shows that, whenever it is optimal for the
monopolist to be unconstrained in a least one state, then monopolist's optimal
capacity k;,, exceeds km.
Finally, it is worthwhile to perform some further comparisons. First, notice
that market excess capacity, obtained by aggregating firms excess capacities as
referred in proposition 3, is greater under duopoly than under monopoly. Indeed,
market excess capacity in the monopoly case is equal to k;,, - km;. As under
duopoly, market excess capacity is equal to 2(k' - k), and a direct comparison
using (9), (13), (6) and (10), reveals that k;,, - km < 2(k' - k).
On the other hand, it is useful to compare, for the duopoly situation, the
expected price and output in the uncertain demand case with price and output in
the certainty equivalent case. For the latter, the output obtains as

(14)
11

and price as

n

LPiAi
P(2k) =

'= 1 3

+

~(13+1).

(15)

In the uncertain demand case, under conditions (8) which guarantee that the firms
choose the SSPE to be unconstrained up to state i', expected output writes as

which, by (6), is equal to

as in {14). AB for the expected price, we get

and it is easily checked that this expected price is equal to P(2k). Accordingly,
we obtain the following
Proposition 4. Whenever it is optimal Joi· the firms to be unconstraine.d up so
state i', expecte.d price and output at the SSPE coincide with the price and output
corresponding to the certainty equivalent case.
5. Concluding remarks

In this paper we have analyzed the investment behaviour of firms when they
are simultaneously faced with a random demand and with rival firms in the industry. Under the restricted assumption of a linear demand with a random intercept
over the states of Nature, we have shown that there exists a symmetric equilibrium
at which firms operate in excess capacity, when compared with the capacity they
would choose in the certainty equivalent case. Our analysis is original, we feel, to
this extent that it deals with the strategic behaviour of firms when they operate
in an uncertain environment.

The paper calls for two natural extensions. The first would be to generalize the
above analysis to other cost structures and different random demand environments.

12

The other one would consider the problem of investment in entry deterrence when
demand fluctuates randomly. We have in mind an extension of the paper by Dixit
(1980) which would consider sequential entry in an industry faced with uncertain
demand.

References
Dixit, A. (1980). The role of investment in entry deterrence. Economic Journal,
90, 95-106.
Dreze, J.H. and J.J. Gabszewicz (1967). Demand and fluctuations, capacity utilization and prices. Operations Research Verfahren, 3, 119-141.
Dreze, J.H. and E. Sheshinski (1976). Demand fluctuations, capacity utilization
and costs. American Economic Review, 66, 731-742.
Kandori, M. (1991). Correlated demand shocks and price wars during booms.
Review of Economic Studies, 58, 171-180.
Leland, H. (1972). Theory of the firm facing random demand. American Economic
Review, 62, 278-291.
Oi, W. (1961). Uncertainty, prediction and competitive equilibrium. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 29, 58-64.
Rotemberg, J. and G. Saloner (1986). A supergame-theoretic model of price wars
during booms. American Economic Review, 70, 390-407.
Sandmo, A. (1971). On the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty.
American Economic Review, 61, 65-73.
Smith, K.R. (1969). The effect of uncertainty on monopoly price, capital stock
and utilization of capital. Joumal of Economic Theory, 1, 48-59.

13

Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
If capacity is not binding under state s. the best reply against k' in the
second-stage game obtains as the solution of the maximization problem
max(A, - k' - q)q -

'fq,

q

i.e.

A, -

~· -

~ R,(k').

"!

Now assume that firm 1 deviates from k' to some new level of capacity k 1 ~ k'.
When k' < k 1 ~ A,+!; - 'Y it is clear that such a deviation cannot be profitable
since k* is the best reply in the first stage game against k' as long as k1 is in the
interval
'Y]. So we have only to consider in the sequel values of

[A, 31, Ai±!i -

k1

~ A,+g -"(. Lets be any state with i' < s < n. If k1 E [R,(k'), R,+ 1 (k')[~'

I., it is optimal for firm l to play Ra(k') in the second stage game in state u, for

u E {i' + 1, ··-,s}. For u E {s + 1,-· · ,n}, firm 1 is constrained by k 1 since it
cannot use Ra(k*) in the second stage gan1e. Accordingly, the payoffs of firm l in
the fust stage game when kz E [R,(k'), R,tl(k')[ is given by:
II(k
(Aa-'1) +
s 11 k')~,f..
~ P(f
2

u=l
n

+

L

3

~
~

Pa (Aa-k'
2
u=:i•+1

(I)

Pa(Aa - ki - k' - 'f)k1 - f3k1.

u=s+l

Assume first that k1 E ~1
'a , A-·+1
' -2 k' - 'I [ . Then payoffs to firm 1 of the

[

first stage game is, given by (see (2))

We know that k1 = k* is the best reply against k' for k 1 in this domain since the
payoff (A.1) coincides with (2), from which k' has been shown to be the unique
solution to the maximization problem.

-'r·, A··+z-k'
-~[
Now assume that k1 E [ A·+1-k'
'
'
' = I,.+ 1 . In this
2
2
domain the payoff of the first stage game given firm 2 plays k', obtains by applying

14

formula (I) with s = i* + 1, i.e.

(A.2)

n

L

+

p,(Aa - k• - k, -7)k1 - f3k1.

u=i•+2

It is easy to check that

iJ2II,.~~~ki, k•) < 0, so that II,.+ 1 is strictly concave.

On

the other hand,
n

L
8IIi·+1
- - - -_ 0 ¢:> k 1 --k- 11
iJk1

p,A, - {3

<!.o.fu=i"+2
k*+'Y
_ _ _n_ _ _ - -

~

2 L...J Pu

2

u=i•+2

Now assume that

This implies that

L

f3 <

p,(A, - A·+i),

u>i" +1

which contradicts the left part of inequality (8), so that
A,·+i -k• -'Y
k11 <
2
Accordingly. the value of k1 which maximizes the function II,.+ 1 (k 1 , k•) does not
belong to I,.+ 1 • Thus. by strict concavity of II,. + 1 (k 1 , k• ), the optimal value of
IIi'+i. when k1 is restricted to I,.+2, lies on the left boundary of!,.+!, i.e. at
k1 = A,. +l k• - 'Y. Moreover, substituting the values of k 1 in (A.l) in II;- ( ., k•),

2

we see that

II;· ( A.-+1-k'-'1 ,k·) =II;·+1 (A;·+1-k'-'Y ,k·) .
2
2
Since

II,. ( A·+i

~k' - 7 .k•)

no deviation k 1 in l;·+i is profitable.
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<II,.(k',k')

(A.3)

Now assume that k1 E Ii'+2· Applying fromula (I) with s = ;•
for k1 E I,.+2,

;• (A0"-1 )
Il;·+2(k1,k )=~Pa - --

4

2

*

3

+ Pi•+2

(A

It is easy to check that

( •i·+1-

+P;·+1

)2 I:

··+2- k' -"/
'
' 2

n

k* -')' )

+ 2,

we get.

2

2
Pa(Aa - k' - k1 -1)k1 - f3ki.

a=i•+3

fPII,.B~~ki, k') <

0, so that

rr,.+ 2

is strictly concave.

1

Furthermore,

n

[}IIi'+2

-~-

[}~

I;

PaAa -

i3

k • + 'Y,
O k
k- def a=i•+3
= ¢:} 1 = 12 = - - - = - - - - - - n
2
2

I:

Pa

a=i•+3

A-. +2 - k' - 'Y
Now suppose that k12 2'. '
' . This implies
2
n

(3 S

I:

(Aa - A,.+2)

CT=i• +3

and 1 a fortiori,
n

i3 S

I;

Pa (A, -A·+2) + Pi'+2 (A,.+2 -A,·+1).

a=i•+3

This, in turn, implies

n

f3 S

I:

Pu (A, - A,.+1)

u=i"+2

However the last inequality contradicts the left part of (A.1). Accordingly,
the value of k, which maximizes II,.+2(k 1 ,k') does not belong to l;·+z- Thus.
by strict concavity of Il;•+z, the optimal value of II,.+z, when k 1 is restricted to
- k' - "'. Hence, for
l;-+2, lies on the left boundary of I,.+2, i.e at k 1 = A·+2
'
2
all k1 E I[. +2 , we have
Il;·+2(k1, k')

- k' -1
)
s 1f;•+2 ( A-·+2
'
2
'k'
16

.

(A.4)

Moreover, substituting this value of k1 in II,+ 1(-, k'), we see that
.
(Ai·+2 - k' -7 ,k·) .
Ili•+2 ( A,.+2 - k' - 7 ,k ·) _-II,·+1
2
2

(A.5)

1
7
Now ' by Strl.ct concav1·ty of II···+ 1 and tl1e fact that k- 11 < A,·+
- -;/'
- - , 1't
follows that
rri·+i ( A,·+2 - k' - 7 ,k·) < II;·+1 (A;·+1 - k' -7 ,k·) .
2
2
- k' - 'Y' > A-·+1
- k' since ( A-·+2
'
'
2
2
we get

(A.6)

7) . Furthermore, using {A.3) and (A.6),

Finally comparing (A.4) and (A. 7), we obtain

for all k1 E Ii·+z• which proves that no deviation k1 in I[.+ 2 is profitable.
Proceeding in the same fashion for k1 in Ii·+3• Ii'+4 ···In, it can be shown
that no deviation k 1 ~ k' can be profitable for firm 1.
Now let us consider deviations kl with ki::; k'. When A,. 3-y ::; k 1 < k', it
is clear that such a deviation cannot be profitable, since k' is the best reply in the
first stage game against k' as long as kl is in the interval [ A-.
' 3- , A-·+1
• 3.

7

So we have only to consider the values of k1 ::;
1 ::; s

7]

b.-=-1 Let s be any state with

~-

< i'. Denote by D, the interval [ A,i J, A,+~ - J [, 1 < s ::; i' -1. When

k 1 ED,, 1 < s::; i' -1, the payoff II,(k 1, k') of firm 1 in the first game is given
by

(II)

n

+

L

Pu(Au - k' -7 - kl)k1 - f3k1.

CT=i*+l
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Assume first that k 1 E D,. - l · In this domain. the payoff of the first stage game.
given that firm 2 plays k•, obtains by applying formula (II) with s = i• - 1. i.e.

~

IIi'-1 (k1, k') = ~Pu

(A-1)
T

2

+ p;·

(

A,. -

A·-"t
)k1
'
- k1
3
-1

n

L

+

Pu(Au -k' - kl -1)k1 - f3k1.

a=i•+I
82

It l·s easy to theck that

IIi'-l
. st ric
. tl y concave. 0 n th e
8ki < 0 , so tha t II ,. -1 1s

other hand,

an,. -1

_

--- -

8k1

0 ¢:}

k _ k-

~r [j;_ PuA,, - fJ]

13 -

1 -

~
L. Pu
O'=i·

- is strictly smaller than
Notice that if k13

A'

0

-1 , then we would have
3

n

{J>

L

p,,(Au-A,.),

u=i•+l

which contradicts the right part of inequality (A.1).
Accordingly, the value of k 1 which maximizes the function II,._ 1 exceeds the
right extreme of the interval
1. Thus, by strict concavity of rr,._ 1(k1,k'),

D,._

the optimal value of IIi'-1 (k 1 , k') when kl is restricted to D,·-1, lies on the right
A.
- 't . Moreover, substituting this value of k
boundary of
'
1 , i.e. at k 1 =
1
3
in (2), we see that

D,._

rr,._1

' ', k. ) = rr,. (A·-1
' 3 , k' ) s rr,. (k*, k').
( A.-~
3

Accordingly, no deviation from k' can be profitable by reducing capacity in D,._ 1.
Applying the analogous reasoning held above for values of k 1 S k', it can be
shown that no deviation in D,.-2. D,._ 3 , · · ·, D 1 can be profitable to firm 1. Consequently, no deviation k1 S k' can be profitable for firm 1. A perfectly similar
argument applies to show that no deviation from k' can be profitable either for
firm 2.
This completes the proof of proposition 2.
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